The Fight Against Korean Deployment to Hormuz Continues

President Lee Jae Myung in February, 2026 -- Republic of Korea from Seoul, Republic of Korea, via Wikimedia Commons

By Dae-Han Song

On 20 September, South Korea’s Lee Administration stated that, contrary to foreign media coverage, it had not rejected Trump’s request for support in the Strait of Hormuz. The New York Times might be forgiven for failing to read between the lines when Lee stated that he would not be deploying combat troops to the Strait of Hormuz but left open the possibility of sending an anti-piracy unit in the area. While President Lee backtracked from his original deployment proposal after facing organized pressure from social movements and falling approval ratings, it’s unclear how he will weather President Trump’s pressure especially since Lee’s key projects are tied to Trump’s Pax Silica. Thus, the fight against Korean support for Trump’s war continues.

Swift, Organized Backlash

On Sep. 3rd, President Lee had announced the possibility of deploying troops to the Strait of Hormuz. Social movements understood that the media leak was the Lee administration testing the waters of public opinion and, thus, rapidly mobilized a fierce and loud opposition to deployment. This was particularly pressing given the rumblings that a motion for deployment might be introduced into the National Assembly two weeks later before the long Harvest Day festival holiday.

After a week of rallies, marches, and press conferences, on 15 September, an urgent action coalition brought together 550 organizations and established an encampment in front of the US Embassy in Seoul’s main Gwanghwamun square. Civil society organizations would rotate occupying the encampment and leading the marches and rallies. Every night, they marched from the US Embassy to the Blue House. Amidst such organized protest and falling approval ratings, the Lee administration backtracked: in a sober and self-reflective press conference on 18 September, the Lee Administration clarified that it would not deploy military troops into the Strait of Hormuz nor intervene militarily. While Lee’s backtracking was a response to mass mobilization, his administration has left open the expansion of operations of the Cheonghae Anti-Piracy Unit already in the region. In fact, his administration publicly refuted mainstream media coverage stating that ‘it is not a refusal’ to Trump’s request.

Trump’s Leverage

President Lee’s inability to refuse is because he is staking South Korea’s economic future on Trump’s Pax Silica. More specifically, the Lee Administration is staking the future of Korea’s economy into three megaprojects that are firmly embedded in the US AI global value chain. In addition, the Lee Administration is vying for a transfer of wartime operational control of the Korean military to the Korean government.

In both instances we must ask ourselves, not simply whether achieving these projects is worth abetting war crimes and prolonging economic crises, but whether these projects, in their present form, are even worth it. In the short-run, the three megaprojects—semiconductor production, physical AI (i.e., robots), and data centres—might increase Korea’s GDP. However, in the long run, these projects feed and feed off of an uncontrolled and unregulated AI bubble that not only poses existential threats (i.e., AI use in war, rogue AI) but also calls into question a green energy transition: how effective is expanding renewable energy in combating global warming when energy consumption is expanding so rapidly and unchecked.

Secondly, is the transfer of wartime operational control simply a Faustian deal? Implicit in any transfer is the acknowledgement that South Korea will still be beholden to the United States. It’s an open secret that South Korea can defend itself: in conventional warfare, it ranks 5th globally. The real concern for the United States is ensuring South Korea’s fealty if given wartime operational control. Fortunately for the US, there are great structural dependencies that will still make South Korea’s military beholden to the US’s. More specifically, the transfer of wartime operational control does not extricate the South Korean military from the US Forces in Korea. The independence is marginal: if currently a four-star US general served as the commander and a four-star ROK general was the deputy commander; now, the US general would be the deputy and the ROK one would be the commander. And, while having command of one’s military during war is significant, this shift in hierarchy does little to dismantle or even flip South Korea’s structural dependence (military and economic) on the United States. In fact, Lee’s economic strategy makes South Korea even more dependent upon the US. Regaining control of one’s military is central to national sovereignty. However, wartime operational control is only one element in achieving it.

President Lee faces great pressure from President Trump to support the US war of aggression against Iran. While Trump frames sending troops as being in South Korea’s interest in securing freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, through which 61 percent of South Korea’s oil imports flow, it’s clear that sending troops and ships does nothing to achieve such a goal. Even a cold-hearted pragmatist can’t but scoff at the absurdity of additional South Korean troops opening the Strait of Hormuz when the US, the world’s greatest naval power, cannot. Ultimately, Korean troops only provide a thin veneer of legitimacy for Trump who needs victories before the November elections and help prolong this war of aggression.

No to Supporting an Illegal War

The struggle against deployment continues because for Korea’s social movements the goal is not just about keeping Korean sailors from the line of fire. Our struggle is to end the US’s illegal war of aggression against Iran. This means that the South Korea government needs to hold the line against Trump’s war and refuse any assistance whether in the frontlines or in the rear, whether combat or non-combat. It is in South Korea and the world’s best interest to open the Strait of Hormuz by achieving peace through diplomacy.

Dae-Han Song is a part of the International Strategy Center and the No Cold War collective and is an associate at the Korea Policy Institute.

This article was produced by Globetrotter.