Mao reviews a PLA tank unit after the liberation at the Xiyuan Airport Beijing, March 1949
Published in the English language magazine People's China in February, 1950 just three and a half months after the proclamation of the People's Republic of China and while battle for various islands and Tibet continued, this fascinating article looks at the triumph of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) over the counter-revolutionary and imperialist backed forces of the Kuomintang.
(Please note that many of the translations of the names of places and people are now considered out-of-date)
The Road to Victory
A Survey of the Three and a Half Year War of Liberation by Tsai Ying-p'ing
The People's Liberation Army has just finished mopping up the last pockets of organized Kuomintang resistance on China's mainland. The only sections of China over which the Kuomintang can still claim even nominal control are Tibet, Taiwan Island, a part of Hainan Island and a few small coastal islands such as Kinmen and Tinghai. Now 39 cities and county towns remain in Kuomintang hands.
The War of Liberation has reached a period of lull before entering its final phase, in which Chiang Kai-shek's forces will be pried out of their island retreats. The PLA is now preparing its ranks for this last offensive, and the people of China are confident that 1950 will bring the revolutionary war to a successful close.
This confidence is founded upon fact, and not upon wishful thinking. While it is true that the American imperialists are using every means at their disposal to reinforce the few remaining Kuo-mintang strongholds, even the reactionaries cannot help admitting that such efforts are futile. In the days when American aid flowed to Chiang in a far more generous stream than today, the PLA was not prevented from liberating a total of 8,474,500 square kilometres within the brief space of three and a half years. More than half of this area, or 5,511,700 square kilometres, was liberated in the half year ending December 31, 1949. During this six-month period, a population of 181,256,000 was liberated, exceeding the entire population of the African con-tinent. Can it therefore take long to liberate the 11,233,000 people still under Kuomintang domination, or to free the last 1,122,500 square kilometres of Chinese territory?
But in the midst of the widespread optimism that peace can soon be won in China, the people do not forget the heroic and self-sacrificing struggles of the past, without which there could have been no such prospects of speedy victory today. It has become increasingly clear to all that without such a revolutionary army as the PLA, an army of the people that comes from the people, works for the people and forever remains with the people, there would have been no victories at all. As never before, there is now a general understanding of the profound truth which Stalin expressed as early as 1926 when he said:
"The Chinese revolutionary army constitutes the most important factor in the struggle of the Chinese workers and peasants for their emancipation."
Stalin placed special emphasis upon the fact that the Chinese Communists must strengthen their political work in the army, converting it into a propagator of revolutionary ideas. He also advised the Chinese Communist Party to pay great attention to military affairs, never relegating them to a secondary position for a moment.
At first, many Chinese revolutionary leaders did not appreciate the full significance of Stalin's advice. It was Chairman Mao Tse-tung and his close associates who carried out Stalin's suggestion and gradually built up the Red Army until it developed into the modern, invincible PLA of today.
But in the very early years from 1921 to 1927 (that is, from the birth of the Chinese Communist Party to the collapse of the Great Revolution), the Party centred its attention largely on strikes, petitions, demonstration; protests and such non-military forms of struggle; it did not arm the people although there were many opportunities to do so. As a result, the revolutionary forces were decimated when the reactionaries launched their reign of terror against the people. The Great Revolution was thus brought to a halt by the counter-revolutionaries who had managed to seize military power.
This experience taught the people that when faced by an enemy that was heavily armed and supported by world imperialism, they had only one recourse — to take up arms in self-protection. And this is what the people did. Arming themselves, they carved out various small revolutionary bases which were gradually expanded and linked together. Never once did the people ever lay down their weapons again. That is the reason why they were able to withstand the ten years of civil war, the eight years of war against Japan, and finally to overthrow the reactionaries in the soon-ending War of Liberation.
Summing up the valuable experience of these many years of revolution, Chairman Mao has said: "The essence of the experience consists of the following three factors:
1. A disciplined party armed with the theory of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, employing the method of self-criticism and closely linked with the masses;
2. An army led by such a party; and
3. A united front of all revolutionary strata and all revolutionary parties and groups, led by such a party.
From Defensive To Offensive At the start of the War of Liberation, in July, 1946, many observers thought the People's Armies had no chance of victory, in view of the overwhelming superiority of the Kuomintang troops, both in number and in equipment.
One side, the side of the counter-revolution, had mobilized 4,300,000 troops equipped with US-made arms and the weapons of 1,000,000 Japanese soldiers who had been disarmed by the Kuomintang. Furthermore this side was backed by the arsenals of American imperialism.
The other side, the side of the revolution, had the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies (later called the People's Liberation Army), totaling only 1,200,000 troops.
The ratio of military strength was 3.58 to 1 in favour of the counter-revolutionaries.
Encouraged by this situation, the Kuomintang lined up 80 per cent of its troops on the battlefield and launched an all-out offensive against the Liberated Areas, trying to crush the people's forces once and for all.
But it is now obvious that Chiang and his American patrons incorrectly evaluated the military situation. Their statistical figures regarding the relative military strength of the two armies were correct enough, but they made the fatal blunder of forgetting to add in the strength of the people — a factor that upset all their calculations. They could not understand that the people solidly and whole-heartedly supported the PLA, because the revolutionary armed struggle had been inseparably linked with the agrarian revolution of the peasants, who made up more than 80 per cent of the population.
As the fighting gained momentum and spread along a vast battle-front, the reactionaries made another grave blunder. Not yet realizing what it meant to fight against an armed revolutionary people, they kept to the orthodox military strategies that had proved victorious in previous imperialist wars. They began to trade off their troops in ex-change for big cities, counting their victories only in terms of areas occupied — preferably areas of sufficient renown to be mentioned by the world press.
In the first year of the war, front July, 1946 to June, 1947, the following numbers of cities and troops changed hands:
KMT: took over 335 cities and county seats and lost 1,120,000 men.
PLA: took back 288 cities and county seats and lost 358,000 men.
On the average, the Kuomintang paid one division for one city. And since "war is a rivalry be-tween men" (Karl Clausewitz), not between cities, it was already evident that they would lose the cities too after losing their divisions. General Liu Po-cheng, one of the brilliant military leaders in China, pointed out in late 1946 that:
"If you keep men and lose land, The land can be taken again; If you keep land and lose men, You lose both land and men."
In the first half of the second year of war, (July - December 1917), the war situation underwent a drastic change. After reducing the enemy's strength from 4,300,000 to 3,730,000 (taking into account 550,000 new recruits) and expanding its own forces from 1,200,000 to 1,950,000, the People's Liberation Army passed over to the strategic offensive.
The counter-offensive began on July 1, 1947, on the southern front where General Liu Po-cheng's army forced a breach in the Kuomintang defence line along the Lunghai Railway and poured south to the Tapieh Mountains, deep in the enemy's rear. From then on, the main theatre of operations was shifted to the Kuomintang-controlled areas.
The powerful offensive of the PLA, which rapidly spread to every front, astonished the world. It threw Chiang and his American military advisors into utter confusion. New measures were improvised with the help of the American Advisory Group to check the advance of the PLA. But none of their schemes, either political, economic or financial, brought more than momentary respite.
By the second half of the second year of war, the PLA was ready to attack the Kuomintang's key strongholds and units. A number of cities of strategic importance, such as Kaifeng, Paochi, Weihsien, Yenchow and Szepingkai, fell one after another.
The Kuomintang defences were tottering.
A Decisive Year
The first basic change in the war came when the PLA went over to the offensive. The second occurred in the latter half of 1948, when the PLA began to place greater emphasis on modern positional warfare.
In autumn, 1948, the PLA for the first time in history gained numerical superiority over its enemy. By July, 1949, the PLA had 4,000,000 troops com-pared to the Kuomintang army's 1,490,000— a ratio of 1 to 0.31. This change was of vital importance since it greatly shortened the course of the war and provided the conditions necessary for attacking the Kuomintang's most strongly defended bases.
The PLA's new strategy was illustrated during the Battle of Tsinan, in September, 1948. Tsinan, the provincial capital of Shantung, was one of the Kuomintang's key strategic bases in the East China War Zone. It was strongly fortified and garrisoned by more than 100,000 troops. Surrounded by rivers and mountains, the city was easy to defend but hard to attack. Nevertheless, the battle lasted only eight days. Results: 61.800 Kuomintang officers and men were captured, together with area commander, General Wang Yao-wu; the three brigades of the 84th Reorganized Division under General Wu Hue-wen came over to the PLA.
The PLA's skill in mastering modern positional warfare was further demonstrated during the Battles of "West Liaoning-Mukden" (Sept. 12 to Nov. 2, 1948), "Huai Hai" (Nov. 7, 1948 to Jan. 10. 1949) and "Peking-Tientsin-Kalgan" (Dec. 5, 1948 to Jan. 15. 1949). During these campaigns. Chiang lost 148 divisions, or 1,548,000 men, including the 26 divisions under General Fu Tso-yi who agreed to surrender and handed over Peking without bloodshed. Chiang's four remaining crack units, the New 1st, New 5th and New 8th Armies and the 11th Reorganized Division, were wiped out in the course of these campaigns.
After these crushing defeats, the Kuomintang tried to gain a breathing spell by launching a so-called "peace offensive" early in 1949. "Peace talks" proceeded for weeks, but when a final agree-ment had been reached in the middle of April, the bogus Acting President Li Tsung-jen rejected it.
On April 20th. one million PLA troops began to pour across the Yangtze River. Three days after the crossing, the PLA entered Nanking, the Kuo. mintang capital. On May 27th, Shanghai was liberated. And so was Canton in South China on October 14th.
Mopping Up
The war then entered a mopping-up stage.
In the first half of the fourth year of war, all of China's mainland was liberated with the sole exception of Tibet. The PLA took over 963 cities and county towns, including 13 provincial capitals. Chiang lost 1,764,220 men in this period, or 259 entire divisions. Of these, 786,920 were taken prisoner, 92,220 were casualties, 215,070 surrendered, 637,980 revolted and came over, and 22,030 accepted reorganization terms. This brought Chiang's total losses during the three-and-a-half years of war to 7,445,620 men.
Throughout the war the Kuomintang had served as the PLA's main source of supplies. Here is a partial list of the equipment which the Kuomintang army has transported to the front for the PLA since July, 1946:
Artillery pieces 52,051
Machine guns 297,740
Rifles and body arms 2,612,126
Aircrafts 183
Warships 168
Tanks 598
Armoured cars 378
Automobiles and trucks 20,513
Rounds of ammunitions 492,799,700
Shells 5,183,390
The PLA is now poised to make its last thrust, which will bring China's revolution to a victorious close. The whole history of the PLA, and of the revolutionary war it fought, provides conclusive proof that if the people in colonies or semi-colonies want true independence, they must rely principally upon their own armed strength.