What Happened at La Mejorana?: Cuban Revolutionary History

By Elier Ramírez Cañedo and Mónica Corrieri, translated from the Spanish

One of the most remarkable and enigmatic moments in Cuban history is the famous La Mejorana meeting on May 5, 1895, which brought together three iconic figures of the nineteenth century: José Martí, Antonio Maceo, and Máximo Gómez.

The meeting between the three leaders of the Revolution took place at the house of the administrator of the old sugar cane mill of La Mejorana, Germán Álvarez; a site currently located in the province of Santiago de Cuba. It was a spacious four-room cottage, with a beautiful flamboyant in the back yard. What the congregants might not have realized was that the house set to host the most pivotal meeting of the Revolution of 1895 was already known to Spanish commanders as a regular hangout for the mambises. According to the account of Ensign Ramón Garriga, at that time assigned as Martí's assistant, the lunch table was set under the courtyard's flamboyant and 18 people sat at it: Gómez in the center, Martí on his right and Antonio Maceo on the left. To the right of the Apostle, José Maceo; and to the left of General Antonio, Paquito Borrego and Jesús Rabí. The administrator of the hacienda, Germán Álvarez, also took a place at the table. (1)

Despite the many versions of that important meeting, Martí's account is still the most complete. The Apostle’s notes from May 5 reveal a tense meeting between three men deeply passionate about Cuba’s freedom, though they did not see eye to eye on how to organize the struggle: "Maceo and Gómez speak softly, close to me: they call me a little later, there in the doorway: that Maceo has another idea of government: a junta of generals in command, represented by their delegates, along with a General Secretariat. (...) We go to a room to talk. I can't untangle Maceo's conversation: "Do you stay with me, or do you go with Gómez?" and he to me, interrupting my words, as if I were the embodiment of the legal government and its representative."(2)

Martí's words make it clear that the old tensions from the Ten Years' War and the Little War, between civil and military authority, were still present. Maceo stood firmly for a military power free from civilian interference.

He believed the war against Spain had to be won before even thinking about having a fully functioning civilian government. Martí disagreed, because he aspired to a balance of powers: "The Army is rough and free, embodying the nation and all its dignity.," he wrote in his diary that same day. (3) On this occasion, the Generalissimo backed the Delegate’s ideas. In the end, despite disagreements about convening an Assembly of Delegates to form a government, Maceo set aside his own stance in favor of their perspective and agreed to send four delegates to represent the province of Oriente.

On May 18, 1895, in his famous unfinished letter to Manuel Mercado, Martí expanded his concept of how the power structures of the Revolution should be organized: "The revolution seeks complete freedom within the army, free from the barriers once imposed by a Chamber lacking royal approval, the mistrust of youth wary of its republicanism, or the envy and concerns over potential future dominance from a punctilious or visionary leader. At the same time, it demands clear and dignified republican representation—a spirit of humanity and respect, driven by the desire for personal dignity, that inspires and sustains revolutionaries in the fight." (4)

Subsequently, in a letter from Maceo to Gómez, dated June 16, 1895, it is confirmed that the discussion around the formation of an Assembly had been one of the central issues debated at the meeting. In this letter, Maceo reminded Gómez of his position at the time: "The last time you, Martí and I met, I thought the formation of the government was a little premature, but today the strength of the revolution demands it." (5)

Another issue that came up at the meeting was Maceo's displeasure with the appointment of Flor Crombet as head of the expedition that had brought him from Costa Rica. Martí also makes it explicit in his diary: "I see him wounded. “I love him,” he tells me, “less than I once did, because of his subordination to Flor during the expedition and the way he spent his money.” (6)

It is known, from what Martí wrote in a letter to Carmen Miyares and by Gómez in his diary, that on the day of May 6 Maceo invited them both to visit his camp and presented them to the troops, to express his apologies in some way, after having made them sleep outside the camp the day before, a result of his momentary anger following the discussions at La Mejorana. "And so, as if lying down, with somber thoughts we slept," (7) Martí had written in his diary. For his part, about the visit to Maceo's camp, Gómez noted in his diary on May 6: "... as we marched toward Bayamo, puzzled and amazed by General Antonio Maceo’s behavior, we came across one of the outposts of his camp, which held over two thousand men, and were ushered inside. The General offered his apologies as best he could, but we paid little attention, for the slight and bitter disappointment of the previous day were quickly replaced by the enthusiasm and respect with which we were welcomed and cheered by his troops." (8)

But one inevitable question remains: what really happened between Gómez and Maceo in that meeting? According to the prominent historian Jorge Ibarra, who in his book José Martí, dirigente, político e ideólogo has given in our opinion the most objective version of that meeting, Maceo really had more reasons to be irritated with Gómez than with Martí. In the end, Gómez had been the one who had called for the formation of an Assembly of Delegates to constitute the government of the Republic in Arms, which had provoked Maceo's resolute and energetic opposition. Likewise, Maceo knew that the Generalissimo had given his full support to the decision of the Delegate of the Cuban Revolutionary Party to place him under the orders of Flor Crombet, the most critical point of the disagreements that emerged among the revolutionary leaders in La Mejorana. (9)

Apparently, in that interview there was also a discussion about the invasion of the West – the dream of Generals Gómez and Maceo – as well as the allocation of army commands. Both chiefs had varying interpretations regarding the timing of the start of the invasion campaign. It seems likely that Gómez asked Maceo to lure the enemy toward him, while he headed to Camagüey to support him. Ass for Martí, given his determination to speed up the war’s progress and bring about victory as quickly as possible, it appears he favored setting out west immediately after establishing the government in Camagüey. (10)

It also seems that the potential departure of Martí from the insurrectionary camp was discussed. Maceo believed that having the Apostle abroad was crucial for providing logistical support to Revolution. It is said that Martí declared he wouldn’t leave the island until he had witnessed one or two battles. According to another account from Ramón Garriga, Martí insisted he would not leave Cuba until he had met with Bartolomé Masó and Salvador Cisneros Betancourt. (11) The truth is that Martí’s aim, as shown in his writings from those days, was to reach Camagüey to take charge. After that, he would see what fate had in store for him.

Maybe everything talked about in the sugar mill, along with many lingering questions, could have been understood or settled if there had been access to the four missing pages from Martí's campaign diary dated May 6. In 1948 the former colonel of the Liberation Army, Ramón Garriga, who as Martí's assistant had had the responsibility of protecting the diary, declared to the Diario de la Marina that he carried it at all times in his saddlebags and only gave it to him when he went to make his notes. That’s why he kept it with him during the Battle of Dos Ríos, and after the Apostle’s death, he handed it over to Gómez without a single sheet missing.

When it comes to the occasional disagreements between the key leaders of the Necessary War, it’s nothing to be surprised about, nor should anyone think it meant they lacked mutual affection and admiration. Just looking through the private correspondence of these leaders is enough to show that they did. Moreover, any differences between them always came down to the shared commitment that bound them to Cuba. At the same time, insisting they had no major contradictions is like dreaming up or crafting an idealized history, far removed from reality. In this case, we should highlight the words of Rolando Rodríguez, in his book Dos Ríos: A Caballo y Con el Sol en la frente.

"After all, it was less that they had chosen the company and more that the company had chosen them, for with its vast, imposing nature, it required lions—and lions do not offer affection. The three of them were Martí, refined, charming, and brilliant; Maceo, strong, energetic, and talented; and Gómez, rugged, clever, and determined—men born to lead and guide in their own unique ways, never to be led. Their relations could not, therefore, be easy and that explains their differences.If things had been different, their names might never have made it into the history books or might have only appeared under the names of their superiors." (12)

Notes

1 Rolando Rodríguez: Cuba: La Forja de una Nación, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, Havana, 2005, t. 3, p. 41.

2 José Martí: Campaign Diaries. Critical Edition, Center for Martí Studies, Havana, 2007, pp. 114-117.

3 Ibid., p. 116.

4 Jorge Ibarra: José Martí, dirigente, político e ideólogo, Centro de Estudios Martianos, Havana, 2008, p. 167.

5 Jorge Ibarra: José Martí, dirigente, político e ideólogo, Centro de Estudios Martianos, Havana, 2008, p. 158.

6 Ibid., pp. 116-117.

7 Ibid., p. 117.

8 Campaign Diary of Major General Máximo Gómez, 1868-1899, Printed in the Workshops of the Ceiba del Agua Higher Technological Center, Havana, 1940, p. 333.

9 Jorge Ibarra: José Martí, dirigente, político e ideólogo: Centro de Estudios Martianos, Havana, 2008, p. 161.

10 Rolando Rodríguez: Ob. cit., p. 43.

11 Ibid.

12 Rolando Rodríguez: Dos Ríos: A Caballo y Con el Sol en la frente, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, Havana, 2001, p. 63.

This work was translated and shared via a License CC-BY-NC