After the Dissolution of the SDF: Time for the Left to Rethink the Kurdish Question?
- The Left Chapter

- 3 hours ago
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Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters sit on a vehicle in the north of Raqqa city, Syria February 5, 2017.
By Rezgar Akrawi
The People’s Palace Scene: The End of an Experiment and the Beginning of a Question
On 25 August 2026, Mazloum Abdi announced from the People’s Palace in Damascus the end of the mission of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and their dissolution as an independent military force, alongside the dissolution of the Autonomous Administration and its affiliated military and civilian structures and their integration into the institutions of the Syrian state. This announcement followed the extensive military operation in January, which paved the way for a negotiating track that culminated in the integration of its forces and institutions within the Syrian state.
The conclusion of this armed conflict and the avoidance of further ethnic warfare are generally assessed as positive developments, given the victims of such wars are ultimately the working men and women, both manual and intellectual, from various ethnicities. Although the agreement reduced the likelihood of war and spared the region’s masses further destruction, critics note it omitted clear provisions regarding the issues by the left, such as women’s rights, the secularization of the state, halting privatization, protecting the public sector, guaranteeing the rights of working men and women, both manual and intellectual, and holding democratic elections for all officials.
This development raises broader questions to the left. The model presented for years by a broad segment of the Kurdish and international left as a grassroots social, feminist, and democratic revolution ended with a top-down decision announced from a presidential palace, without a popular referendum and without a clear decision from the councils and communes that were presented to the world as holding actual authority within the Autonomous Administration. Furthermore, the United States, which provided the SDF with substantial military and political support, was a key actor in shaping the course of the war and, ultimately, its resolution. This reveals the limits of relying on major imperialist powers.
At the same time, a portion of the military and party elite within the SDF were absorbed into the institutions of the new state and given important positions, despite the authoritarian and conservative religious character of the new political order, while the Kurdish, Arab, Syriac, and other communities continue to face their economic, social, and political challenges.
Significant gains were achieved for the Kurds, including recognition as an integral part of the Syrian people, recognition of the Kurdish language as a national language and Nowruz as a national holiday, and the annulment of the effects of the 1962 Al-Hasakah census. These are real gains that generations have fought for, and they must be constitutionally entrenched so they are not left dependent on decrees that could be altered. Concerns are heightened due to the nature of the new authority in Damascus and its record of repression and violations, and the absence of clear and binding guarantees. Therefore, transforming national and democratic rights into constitutional guarantees is a fundamental part of any genuine political transition.
The Contradiction Between Rhetoric and Practice
A large part of the left was drawn to the concept of “Democratic Confederalism” and the theories of Abdullah Öcalan, viewing the Autonomous Administration experience as a model transcending the nation-state. However, practice revealed contradictions between the rhetoric of grassroots democracy and the concentration of military and financial decision-making in the hands of unaccountable party cadres.
Furthermore, the heavy reliance on American funding and military support tied the project to the calculations of a major imperialist power. When the priorities of this power shifted, the fragility of the model quickly became apparent. In 2018, as an observer of this region I warned about the vulnerability of such an alliance with the United States. This is an important lesson for any movement that presents itself as liberatory or revolutionary: an independent project cannot be built by relying on a major power, especially American imperialism, whose primary concern is the protection of its own strategic interests.
Similar Nationalist Elites, Different Languages — and No Double Standards
The same critique applies to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, where the ruling parties have maintained wide influence, wealth, and power, and familial and party rule, along with restrictions on freedoms, have persisted, while the masses have suffered from unemployment, corruption, and declining services.
Solidarity with the Kurdish people is principled, but it does not mean unconditional alignment with nationalist authorities. Human rights groups have documented violations by ruling powers in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and North and East Syria, yet one cannot deny the SDF’s role in fighting ISIS. The left is called upon to apply a single standard: defending rights regardless of who commits the violations.
Abstract solidarity is insufficient, as peoples are not homogeneous. The left should choose: party elites and rentier bourgeoisies, or the working masses from all communities who bear the costs of poverty and war?
The left is also called on to face hard questions: Does it reject hereditary rule, torture, and assassinations regardless of who commits them? Does it defend freedoms, reject child recruitment, demand fair trials and independent investigations, and reject ties between leftist and liberation movements and imperialist military systems and funding?
Towards a Leftist Alternative
An independent Kurdish nation-state does not appear to be a viable project in the foreseeable future given regional and international circumstances. The events of 2026 have demonstrated the fragility of nationalist entities that rely heavily on support from major powers. The alternative is a shared struggle between Kurds and the rest of the region’s peoples for a democratic state of citizenship, which guarantees individual and collective rights for all nationalities and components.
This state is founded on a democratic constitution, the separation of nationalism and religion from the state, guaranteeing national and cultural equality, a democratic federal system allowing for broad self-governance within a unified state, fair elections, political pluralism, judicial independence, freedom of the press, trade union and political organization, and the rejection of the inheritance of power and familial and tribal rule. It must also be based on social justice, protecting the public sector, rejecting privatization and neoliberalism, and guaranteeing the rights of working men and women, both manual and intellectual, from all nationalities and religions.
As a person of Kurdish origin, involved in the struggle during my youth, and having experienced its hopes, aspirations, and contradictions at close range, I believe criticizing the SDF is not a criticism of Kurdish rights, and criticizing the ruling parties in the Kurdistan Region is not a criticism of the Kurdish cause. Rejecting the nation-state is not a rejection of identity or national rights. It is a call for a leftist and humanist approach that transcends exclusionary nationalism towards a state of citizenship and social justice with a socialist horizon.
Rezgar Akrawi is a leftist writer and researcher focused on technology, AI, the digital revolution, and the development of contemporary leftist thought and practice in response to these transformations. He works as an expert in systems development and e-governance and is a theorist of the concept of the ‘Digital Left’.
This article was produced by Globetrotter.



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