China and the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine

Trump on December 13 -- public domain image

By Tings Chak

On 10 December 2025, U.S. forces seized the oil tanker Skipper off the coast of Venezuela, carrying over a million barrels of crude. “Well, we keep [the oil],” President Trump told reporters. Venezuela’s foreign ministry called it “blatant theft and an act of international piracy,” adding: “The true reasons for the prolonged aggression against Venezuela have finally been revealed. It has always been about our natural wealth, our oil.”

That same day, on the other side of the world, China released its third Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean—the first since 2016—outlining a vision of partnership “without attaching any political conditions.” The timing captures the choice now facing Latin America. Two documents released within a week—Trump’s National Security Strategy (NSS) on 5 December and China’s policy paper five days later— lay bare fundamentally different approaches to the hemisphere.

The Monroe Doctrine Returns

Trump’s NSS makes no pretense of diplomatic subtlety. It declares a ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine, asserting U.S. opposition to “hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets” in the hemisphere. The Western Hemisphere is now America’s ‘highest priority,’ with three threats requiring military response: migration, drugs, and China.

Countries seeking U.S. assistance must demonstrate they are “winding down adversarial outside influence”—a demand that Latin American nations cut ties with Beijing. The strategy promises “targeted deployments” and “the use of lethal force” against cartels. It states that Washington will “reward and encourage the region’s governments…aligned with our principles and strategies.” Unsurprisingly, the U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio rushed to congratulate Chile’s Trump-inspired extreme right wing candidate José Antonio Kast, who won the presidency with 58 percent of the vote—the most right-wing leader since Pinochet.

The tanker seizure shows what this doctrine looks like in practice. Since September, U.S. strikes on boats have killed 95 people. The USS Gerald R. Ford carrier group patrols the Caribbean. As Colombian President Gustavo Petro observed, Trump is “not thinking about the democratization of Venezuela, let alone the narco-trafficking”—only oil. After declaring that a new phase of attacks could include “land strikes on Venezuela”, Trump threatened the Colombian president that “he’ll be next” as well as invasion of Mexico.

China’s Alternative

China’s policy paper operates from an entirely different premise. Opening by identifying China as “a developing country and member of the Global South,” it positions the relationship as South-South cooperation and solidarity rather than great power competition. The document proposes five programs—Solidarity, Development, Civilization, Peace, and People-to-People Connectivity.

What distinguishes this paper from its 2008 and 2016 predecessors is its explicit call for “local currency pricing and settlement’ in energy trade to ‘reduce the impact of external economic and financial risks”—new language directly addressing the weaponization of the dollar. This trend has been underway, as highlighted by the R$157 billion (US$28 billion) currency swap agreement between Brazil and China, signed during Brazilian president Lula’s visit to the Asian country in May this year.

China’s policy paper supports the “Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace”—a pointed contrast to U.S. twenty-first century gunboat diplomacy. And it contains a line clearly responding to Washington’s pressure: “The China-LAC relationship does not target or exclude any third party, nor is it subjugated by any third party.”

The Historical Pattern

Of course, the focus on the “China threat” to “US pre-eminence” in the region is not new. In August 1961, progressive Brazilian Vice President João Goulart visited China—the first high-ranking Latin American official to do so after the Chinese Revolution. At a mass rally in Beijing, he declared that China showed “how a people, looked down upon by others for past centuries, can emancipate themselves from the yoke of their exploiters.”

The U.S. response was swift. American media constructed a narrative linking Brazilian agrarian reform movements to a “communist threat from China.” On April 1, 1964—less than three years after Goulart’s visit—a U.S.-backed military coup overthrew him. Twenty-one years of dictatorship followed.

The playbook remains the same. In the 1960s, the pretext was “communist threat”; today it’s “China threat.” And what’s at stake is Latin American sovereignty. What makes this moment different is economic weight. China-LAC trade reached a record US$518.47 billion in 2024, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce. China’s share of trade with Mercosur countries has grown from 2 percent to 24 percent since 2000. At the May 2025 CELAC-China Forum, Xi Jinping announced a US$9 billion investment credit line. In 1964, Latin America had few alternatives. Today, China presents another option.

The Question Before the Latin American People

The right-wing surge across the continent is undeniable—Kast in Chile, Milei in Argentina, the end of MAS rule in Bolivia. These victories reflect the limitations of progressive governments when addressing crime, migration, and economic stagnation. But they also reflect how U.S.-generated crises become the terrain on which the right wins.

The question is whether Latin American governments—including right-wing ones—want to be subordinates in what Trump’s strategy calls an “American-led world.” Even Western liberal analysts are alarmed. Brookings describes the NSS as “essentially assert[ing] a neo-imperialist presence in the region.” Chatham House notes that Trump uses “coercion instead of negotiation”, contrasted with China, “which has been providing investment and credit… without imposing conditions.”

That being said, China’s presence in Latin America is not without contradictions. The structure of trade remains imbalanced—Latin America exports raw materials and imports manufactured goods. Meanwhile, labor and environmental concerns linked to specific Chinese private enterprises cannot be ignored. Whether the relationship enables development or reproduces dependency depends on what Latin American governments demand: technology transfer, local production, industrial policy. This agenda for a sovereign national project must be pushed forward by the Latin American people and popular forces.

At present, the differences between the two visions being presented of the “U.S.-led world” and a “community with a shared future” have never been starker.

Tings Chak is the Asia Co-Coordinator of the Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research and an editor of Wenhua Zongheng: A Journal of Contemporary Chinese Thought.

This article was produced by Globetrotter.