Four Preliminary Considerations Regarding the 2026 Elections in Peru

Keiko Fujimori speaking on April 13 -- news video screenshot

By José Carlos Llerena Robles

On Sunday, 12 April 2026, Peru held presidential and parliamentary elections for the 2026–2031 term. The deepening political crisis in which Peru has been mired since 2017, the social and economic crisis—recently characterized by issues of public safety and rising fuel prices, respectively—and the return to a bicameral legislature (Senate and Chamber of Deputies) signaled that we were in for a unique electoral process. However, no one expected that the logistical aspects of the electoral process would be the main factor differentiating these elections. Due to operational problems on the part of the state entity responsible for administering the process (ONPE, National Office of Electoral Processes), for the first time in Peru’s republican history, the presidential and parliamentary elections lasted two consecutive days. Because of this negligence (or sabotage?), the top officials of the ONPE are currently facing criminal charges.

Given these circumstances, at the time of writing, the ONPE’s official count stands at just 76 percent. However, despite the sense of uncertainty that has prevailed in the national landscape since Sunday, 12 April, we can draw some conclusions based on the preliminary information available.

Keiko Fujimori Is the Winner in the First Round of the Election

This is a fact, regardless of how the electoral process ultimately concludes. The Ipsos poll (95 percent quick count) places her in first place with 17.1 percent, and it is very likely that this will be confirmed by the official results released by the ONPE. This data shows a categorical finding: Fujimorism remains alive and well in Peru. Despite a proven track record of corruption and human rights violations, Fujimorism is not only still present but, it seems, is successfully navigating the challenges inherent in Peru’s political crisis. The death of the patriarch Alberto Fujimori has led to the unification of the party around the leadership of his daughter Keiko, and the factions that ran in the 2021 presidential elections appear to have faded away. Her slogan, which emphasizes ‘order,’ resonates with a Peruvian society fed up with the social problems plaguing it and the political parties’ inability to address demands such as public safety, among others. Today, Fujimorism is united and strong.

Pedro Castillo and His Supporters, Present

Although not with the same force as in the 2021 elections, the vote of supporters of President Pedro Castillo Terrones—a victim of lawfare—is reflected in the initial results (Ipsos quick count), which place presidential candidate Roberto Sánchez, of the Juntos por el Perú political party, in the presidential runoff against Keiko Fujimori. What is interesting here, beyond whether or not to recognize Pedro Castillo’s leadership within a ‘leftist’ and/or progressive bloc, is understanding the motivations underlying the pull that Pedro Castillo exerts on the votes that currently favor Roberto Sánchez. Five years have passed since the election in which Pedro Castillo emerged victorious in the first round, and there is still much to study about the electorate, including from the popular or leftist side. It is worth recalling that a poll conducted around the time of the 2021 runoff between Pedro Castillo and Keiko Fujimori identified the main motivation for Professor Castillo’s voters as the fact that he resembles an ordinary person (‘he’s just like me’), far surpassing motivations that were simply anti-Fujimori. Sánchez’s advancement to the runoff leaves a necessary task—in addition to safeguarding the vote, since the powerful groups will certainly try to prevent a runoff with a ‘left-wing’ candidate—regarding understanding the impact of Pedro Castillo on the working-class electorate in Peru’s regions.

In Peru, the Left-Right Spectrum is Unhelpful for a Real Understanding of the Electoral Situation

We already made this point in 2021 based on the phenomenon that marked Pedro Castillo’s victory in the corresponding presidential elections. That is why we never characterized Professor Castillo as someone on the left but rather as a popular leader with a sense of sovereignty and social justice. Likewise, the motivations and preferences underlying the popular support of ‘Unofficial Peru’ for Pedro Castillo did not seem to align with the ideological boundaries of a strictly leftist identity. It would be capricious and inaccurate to identify Castillo’s voters as left-wing voters. This consideration is further underscored in these elections; for example, if we examine how to explain that in southern Peru—always characterized as left-leaning—a candidate like Ricardo Belmont Casinelli (a businessman, TV host, and owner of a television channel, hailing from one of the wealthiest families of Lima’s aristocracy) has eroded a significant number of votes that were initially expected to go to Roberto Sánchez. Once again, the problem stems from using the left-right axes to understand Peru based on its electoral preferences. In contemporary Peru, the most evident contradiction—and one that has been reflected most forcefully since the 2021 elections—is not between left and right, or even in terms of capital versus labor. The main contradiction transcends the left-right divide and is more closely linked to issues inherent to coloniality and the relationships between Lima, the capital, and the other regions of Peru.

Porky’s New Right Sets the Stage for the Next Battle

Renovación Popular, led by candidate Rafael López Aliaga—the mayor of Lima who resigned from that post to run for president—has been working for several years to occupy the space that, in various countries across Latin America, is currently being reshaped: the new right. Referring to the continental perspective is not gratuitous, given that this party’s political project—which has grown in organizational strength over the years—draws on the same rhetoric as its counterparts in Argentina, Brazil, and the United States. Its main banner is to wage ‘the culture war’ against the ‘woke’ or, as it is called in Lima, ‘caviar’ progressivism. These banners, as can be seen as the ONPE publishes the election results, have traction only in Lima and some urban centers. Therefore, at this moment, with 76 percent of ballots counted and the votes from Lima and urban centers already tallied, there is a perceived stagnation in López Aliaga’s momentum and a rise in support for Roberto Sánchez driven by votes from rural areas. This is compounded by the fact that, unlike other right-wing candidates, López Aliaga—popularly known as Porky—has resorted to explicitly racist rhetoric against the Andean provinces of southern Peru. Notwithstanding, and given that he will not advance to the runoff, following the style and playbook of the Latin American and Western ‘new right,’ Renovación Popular is already announcing and denouncing electoral fraud—which they will undoubtedly take to court to sustain their organizational and mobilization platform, primarily in Lima, in the face of an impending ‘illegitimate’ government.

Finally, despite trends in the ONPE’s vote count and results from the most reputable polls placing Roberto Sánchez as Keiko Fujimori’s opponent in the presidential runoff, nothing is certain in a country like Peru, which is mired in a serious political crisis. The historic task lies in safeguarding the popular vote for Juntos por el Perú and working on proposals to address the issues that urgently affect Peruvians in their daily lives (security, transportation, food, health, etc.)—issues that undoubtedly stem from structural problems within our economic, political, and social model.

José Carlos Llerena Robles is a lawyer, professor, and researcher.

This article was produced by Globetrotter.