The Three Weeks That Shook Brazil and the World

Aerial shot of a massive Lula election rally in Rio on October 2 -- Lula Oficial, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons

By Luiz Felipe Albuquerque

The different generations who lived through the three weeks between the first and second rounds will never forget their significance. It may have been the greatest mass educational process that Brazilian society has ever experienced.

There were hundreds of demonstrations across Brazil; millions of people took to the streets. Some organized in their neighborhoods, while others wrote flyers and distributed them door-to-door. Flyers were handed out at subway stations, bus stops, and bus terminals. Young people with signs took to the streets, ready to listen to people’s grievances and discuss what was at stake. Carpooling was organized to ensure everyone could vote. Young people drove their grandmothers to the polls on Election Day. There was no shortage of creativity in this decentralized movement. Its members shared a clear objective: elect Lula and stop the return of fascism—along with everything a Flávio Bolsonaro victory would bring.

History—and the people—proved generous to us. And perhaps this was our last chance in this new cycle to take a radically different course and prevent the near future from ending in tragedy.

In 2014, Dilma Rousseff started at a disadvantage in the runoff against Aécio Neves, and her victory was secured only thanks to the grassroots organizations that took to the streets to discuss with the public the differences between the two agendas and what was at stake. As soon as she began her second term, still in January 2015 and in the midst of the post-New Year’s hangover, Dilma enacted two provisional measures harmful to the working class, yielded to pressure from financial capital, appointed Joaquim Levy as Minister of Finance, and made a series of concessions regarding fiscal austerity measures, under the pretext of calming the growing opposition to the government. Two years later, Dilma suffered a blow at the hands of those with whom she had tried to reconcile, and few took to the streets in her defense.

Immediately afterward, with Lula’s imprisonment, the current president’s rhetoric had never been so incisive—brimming with class hatred, attacking the Brazilian elite, and denouncing the role of the mainstream media. Following his victory in the 2022 elections, Lula organized various working groups involving different sectors of society to build a third term with greater popular participation. As soon as his administration began, very little of what had been developed was taken into account; Lula complained about the first protests organized by the MST and pushed for fiscal austerity that limited the government’s social spending.

The result was a government that spent most of its time with a noose around its neck, subject to blackmail by a conservative and extremely powerful Congress.

The only time the government managed to catch its breath was when it decided to go on the offensive, immediately after Congress repealed the decree raising IOF tax rates. From then on, the ‘Congress: Enemy of the People’ movement began: the government presented a confrontational agenda—taxing banks, gambling establishments, and billionaires—politicized the debate, took the dispute to social media, and the public took to the streets to defend a just cause aimed at structural change. Months later, the same movement reemerged when Congress attempted to pass the Constitutional Amendment Proposal (PEC) on Immunity. For the first time, the government stepped out of a defensive posture and regained its capacity for initiative. However, it seems that the lessons learned were short-lived, as evidenced by the struggle to end the 6×1 rotation system.

Despite this being an issue with broad popular support—built from the ground up and led by grassroots movements through a national referendum—the government preferred to negotiate at the highest levels, avoiding debate, politicization, mobilization, and the organization of civil society. In the end, the government and society emerged victorious, thanks to lawmakers’ immense fear of rejecting a proposal backed by more than 70 per cent of the population in the middle of an election year.

And so Lula’s third term continued—a government without major changes, lacking the capacity to significantly improve the lives of the majority, and unable to inspire the masses with faith in a prosperous and transformative future.

The result of all this was clearly reflected in the first round of the elections: a completely uncoordinated campaign, lacking leadership and commitment, incapable of inspiring even the most militant supporters.

But history was on our side, and the best possible outcome occurred: we lost the first round. Had we won in the first round, what would a fourth term for Lula have meant in the face of a disillusioned society, lacking the will to fight and under an even more conservative Congress? The shock of imagining what a Flávio administration would be like saved us.

Now, we face another major challenge. The importance and impact of the PT governments’ social policies are undeniable. But they are no longer enough. The question that remains is: What lessons did Lula draw from this process? How can we keep alive all the energy we’ve seen and experienced in recent weeks?

Greater access to consumption and improved living conditions, on their own—no matter how important they may be—cannot translate into organization and political power. That formula has already shown its limits. The continuity and deepening of these policies depend on a social force that must be built. It is necessary to develop public policies that help organize communities, train leaders, and raise the level of consciousness among the masses.

It has been more than proven that social policies lacking organizational processes can easily be defeated and suffer setbacks between one election and the next. When Lula was first elected in 2002, his victory was not accompanied by a popular uprising.

Twenty-four years later, for the first time in the country’s recent history, a left-wing government was elected thanks to massive mobilizations. For the first time, the excuse of the balance of power can be set aside. For the first time, confrontation and tension can give way to the reconciliation of conflicting interests.

None of these paths will be easy. It all comes down to political decisions, and each one has its consequences. The balance of power is not a given; it is built. The solution lies with the people and their capacity for organization. The solution lies in choosing the paths forward, defining the struggles, politicizing the debate, and unifying public policies with social organization and mobilization.

Luiz Felipe Albuquerque is a journalist and a member of the communications department at the Tricontinental Institute for Social Research.

This article was written by Globetrotter.