Crisis, Coup, and Social Conflict Once Again: Categories of Analysis for the Peruvian Electoral Situation

Voting in Callao, Peru on April 12 -- Johnattan Rupire, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons

By José Carlos Llerena Robles

For some time now, we have maintained that there are three fundamental categories for understanding the Peruvian situation, especially following the popular victory of rural teacher Pedro Castillo Terrones in the presidential elections of 2021. Now, in 2026, in light of the still-unresolved Peruvian electoral process held on 12 April, we can confirm that the categories of crisis, coup, and social conflict remain relevant for understanding the national situation.

Convergence of Crises

Any interpretation of the Peruvian reality that fails to address the convergence of crises Peru has been experiencing for several years is doomed to fail. This convergence of crises consists of the simultaneous occurrence—with varying intensities depending on the moment—of a political crisis (hence the fact that the winner of the first round of the presidential election secured the position with just 17 percent of the vote), an economic and social crisis (exacerbated by the impact of COVID-19 in Peru, a country that had the highest mortality rate globally), an environmental crisis (oil spills along the Peruvian coast, the environmental impact of extractive industries in the Amazon, and the El Niño phenomenon), and a cultural crisis (the blatant racism that has become visible since President Castillo’s victory in 2021).

The recent elections not only confirm the persistence of the crises but also its deepening in certain areas. The political crisis has worsened not only due to the unprecedented number of presidential candidates (35) listed on the ballot, but also because the crisis has now taken root in specific institutions, such as the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE). The resignation of the president of that electoral body, Piero Corvetto—despite the fact that the position is legally non-resignable—due to harassment by the forces of the ‘new right’ led by candidate Rafael López Aliaga, presents a new scenario ahead of the second round of voting. What was once a battle between the popular camp represented by Roberto Sánchez to defend the will of the people—especially in so-called ‘deep Peru’—is now shaping up as a dispute that unites progressive and ‘centrist’ forces seeking to defend the institutional system in crisis.

Finally, the recent purchase by the Peruvian Air Force of 24 F-16 fighter jets from the U.S. company Lockheed Martin for $3.5 billion, despite the opposition expressed by Peru’s current president, José María Balcázar—who argued that such a transaction should be finalized by the president-elect of the 2026 elections—has exacerbated the political crisis. In full view of all Peruvians, it was made clear that in Peru, it is not the president who is in charge, but the U.S. Embassy and its technical and political staff—in this case, officials from the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF).

Coup

Faced with the structural crisis described above, the response of the ruling elites since 2021 has been the same: a coup d’état. Following the parliamentary coup of 7 December 2022, against President Pedro Castillo, the coup strategy has continued.

This year, following the initial results of the presidential election, the claim of electoral fraud has once again been raised by the Popular Renewal Party, led by candidate Rafael López Aliaga, given that he would be left out of the runoff by tens of thousands of votes, trailing behind presidential candidate Roberto Sánchez of the Together for Peru party. To date, the positive outcome for the coup strategy is the resignation of Piero Corvetto, president of the ONPE, while the negative outcome is the refusal by the highest electoral authority to hold additional elections, as demanded by Peru’s ‘new right.’

The coup, from this proposed analytical model, consists of identifying a concrete action resulting from the class struggle in Peru: the selective invalidation of the popular will of a massive group of Peruvians, mainly located in Andean and Amazonian territories, by another concentrated group of Peruvians in the Lima metropolitan area.

In this case, it is worth highlighting two aspects of the coup strategy. First, this time the strategy began with the organized and biased intervention of a powerful television network (América, whose main shareholder is the El Comercio group) and the polling firm DATUM, which, disregarding the recommendations of the electoral authorities, released a poll—using the quick-count methodology—placing López Aliaga in 2nd place and Roberto Sánchez in 5th place. Second, building on the previous point, Rafael López Aliaga called on his supporters to mobilize and denounce “electoral fraud.” Clearly, the goal of canceling the elections or calling for new ones serves as a pretext to maintain a mobilized base through racist, servile, and violent slogans, while also paving the way for the judicialization of politics.

Social Conflict

Just as the ruling classes respond to the crisis through a coup d’état, the working people of Peru respond to it primarily in its social dimension—the aspect they face in their daily lives. The electoral situation unfolds around several critical points of the social crisis that are worth highlighting to explain, in part, certain voting patterns.

On the one hand, the global geopolitical context and rising fuel prices have impacted millions of Peruvians through increased food and transportation costs; this is why the university student movement is beginning to reorganize and mobilize in different parts of Peru, protesting the increase in student transit fares. Likewise, this global context has led to a 100 percent increase in fertilizer prices, directly affecting more than 2 million Peruvian small-scale farmers engaged in family farming. These issues are the ones showing the strongest signs of organization and mobilization among various trade union, social, and political sectors.

On the other hand, in the national context, public safety remains one of the main demands, as do health issues linked to the crisis in the healthcare system and outbreaks of diseases such as pneumonia, measles, and leptospirosis. Unfortunately, these unmet demands, to date, show no signs of organization or mobilization, except within the transportation sector—the primary victims of organized crime—though these efforts have not had a significant impact.

At this point, national sovereignty—called into question by attempts to privatize PetroPerú, the state-owned hydrocarbons company, and the purchase of F-16 fighter jets—presents a significant disruptive element in the collective consciousness, potentially triggering a shift from social protest or dissatisfaction to political contention ahead of the second round of the presidential election, scheduled for June of this year between Keiko Fujimori and Roberto Sánchez.

José Carlos Llerena Robles is a lawyer, professor, and researcher.

This article was produced by Globetrotter